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As legal disputes have become more complex, expert witnesses
have played an increasingly prominent role in many areas of litiga-
tion. Parties to patent infringement cases in particular rely heavily
on experts to resolve the difficult technical issues inherent in these
disputes. Patent cases often involve not only advanced technology,
but complicated damage calculations as well. Typically, the resolu-
tion of patent disputes requires that experts in the sciences, statis-
tics and economics assist in the preparation of litigation and testify
at trial. Particularly when determining damages, "in almost every
case, expert opinions will be necessary."' Expert witnesses fre-
quently charge several hundred dollars per hour.2 If experts are
involved in both preparation and trial, a party's expert witness ex-
penses may total tens or even hundreds of thousands of dollars.3
Consequently, prevailing parties often seek to recover these costs
from their opponents as an element of their damage awards.
While Congress has generally provided for the recovery of ex-
pert witness fees in litigation under the Fees Act,4 it has limited
the amount recoverable to $40 for each day's attendance in court.'
Parties to patent infringement suits have therefore relied on the
Patent Act's attorney fee shifting provision 6 to recover their full
expert witness expenses. Section 285 of the Act allows prevailing
parties to recover "reasonable attorney fees" in "exceptional
t B.S. 1990, The University of California, Berkeley; J.D. Candidate 1993, The Univer-
sity of Chicago.
' Ned L. Conley, An Economic Approach to Patent Damages, 15 AIPLA Q J 354, 386
(1987) (expert testimony necessary to establish reasonable patent royalties).
2 Jean R. Sternlight, The Supreme Court's Denial of Reasonable Attorney's Fees to
Prevailing Civil Rights Plaintiffs, 17 NYU Rev L & Soc Change 535, 571 (1989/90).
' See, for example, Beckman Instruments, Inc. v LKB Produkter AB, 892 F2d 1547
(Fed Cir 1989) (plaintiff claimed expenses of $409,406.10 in compensation for experts and
consultants); Mathis v Spears, 857 F2d 749 (Fed Cir 1988) (affirming award of $45,000 in
expert witness fees); Lam, Inc. v Johns-Manville Corp., 718 F2d 1056 (Fed Cir 1983) (af-
firming award of $29,533.46 in fees for professional consultants).
28 USC § 1920(3) (1988).
28 USC § 1821(b) (1988 & Supp II 1990).
6 35 USC § 285 (1988).
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cases." The "exceptional cases" requirement limits these awards
to cases where the court finds that the losing party has acted in
bad faith.8
When construing attorney fee shifting statutes that do not ex-
pressly provide for expert fee recovery, federal district courts have
split over the issue of whether the Fees Act limits the amount of
expert witness fees recoverable.9 However, in Mathis v Spears,10
the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, which hears all ap-
peals of patent cases, held that although a statute authorizing at-
torney fees without addressing expert witness fees will not ordina-
rily authorize expert fees, a district court could award full expert
witness fees under § 285 in patent cases involving "egregious abuse
of the judicial process" by exercising its "discretion and inherent
equity power."'" The Federal Circuit found that the Patent Act's
attorney fee shifting provision codified the "bad faith" equitable
discretion traditionally enjoyed by the district courts.'2 This equity
power allows the courts to award litigation expenses, including ex-
pert witness fees, in cases involving bad faith despite the absence
of express statutory authorization. 13 Mathis typified several Fed-
eral Circuit cases awarding expert' witness fees under § 285.'4
7 Id.
8 Mathis, 857 F2d at 758.
Opinions in support of such awards include Greenspan v Automobile Club of Michi-
gan, 536 F Supp 411 (E D Mich 1982) (awarding fees of experts used in trial preparation
under the attorney fee shifting provision of the Civil Rights Act of 1964); PPG Industries,
Inc. v Celanese Polymer Specialties Co., 658 F Supp 555 (W D Ky 1987), rev'd on other
grounds, 840 F2d 1565 (Fed Cir 1988) (awarding expert witness fees under the attorney fee
shifting provision of the Patent Act); Codex Corp. v Milgo Electronic Corp., 541 F Supp
1198 (D Mass 1982) (awarding reasonable expenses and disbursements under the Patent
Act's attorney fee shifting provision). Cases in which such awards were denied include Leroy
v City of Houston, 831 F2d 576 (5th Cir 1987) (because the Voting Rights Act does not
specifically allow recovery of witness fees, the district court erred in awarding such costs in
excess of the standard per diem amount); Glenn v General Motors Corp., 841 F2d 1567
(11th Cir 1988) (although the Equal Pay Act shifts to a losing defendant the burden of
paying plaintiff's attorney fees, the statute does not shift witness fees in excess of the
amount allowed by § 1821 because it does not refer explicitly to witness fees); Northcross v
Memphis Board of Education, 611 F2d 624 (6th Cir 1979) (not allowing expert witness fees
to be counted as part of a "reasonable attorney fee" under the Civil Rights Act and allowing
their recovery only pursuant to 28 USC § 1920).
857 F2d 749 (Fed Cir 1988).
' Id at 758-59.
12 Id at 758.
13 Id at 757-58.
" See Beckman Instruments, 892 F2d at 1554 (remanding for an award of expert wit-
ness fees consistent with the decision); Rohm & Haas Co. v Crystal Chemical Co., 736 F2d
688, 693 (Fed Cir 1984) (recognizing the practice of awarding expert witness fees under
§ 285, though not enforcing it); Lam, 718 F2d at 1069 (holding that § 285 permits the pre-
vailing party to recover disbursements that were necessary for the case); Central Soya Co.,
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This Federal Circuit practice has now been called into ques-
tion. In 1991, the Supreme Court considered whether attorney fee
shifting statutes provide sufficient authority to shift expert witness
fees. In West Virginia University Hospitals, Inc. v Casey,15 the
plaintiff, who had prevailed in a civil rights action, attempted to
recover expert witness fees under the Civil Rights Attorney's Fees
Awards Act of 1976.16 The Court held that expert witness fees
could not be shifted as an element of a reasonable attorney's fee. 17
Although the Court ruled specifically on the attorney fee shifting
provision of the Civil Rights Act, the broad language of West Vir-
ginia arguably extends to all attorney fee shifting provisions that
fail to provide expressly for expert witness fee awards.
Because the Federal Circuit has repeatedly awarded expert
fees along with attorney fees under § 285 of the Patent Act, parties
in exceptional patent cases have come to rely on this practice. As a
result, the questions presented by West Virginia regarding the
Federal Circuit's authority to continue to grant such awards are
particularly significant for these litigants. This Comment focuses
on whether the Supreme Court's ruling in West Virginia effec-
tively overrules this Federal Circuit practice, so that district courts
in exceptional patent infringement cases may no longer award ex-
pert witness fees beyond the limits imposed by the Fees Act.
In holding that the term "attorney's fees" does not include ex-
pert witness fees, the Supreme Court in West Virginia under-
scored its increasingly rigorous requirement of "explicit statutory
authority" for expert witness fee awards-as it has in many other
areas of law.'s However, the Court's opinion in West Virginia did
not carefully explore the relationship between this requirement
and the award of expert fees under the district courts' inherent
equity power. This Comment therefore analyzes the relationship
between § 285 and the district courts' equitable authority to award
litigation expenses to prevailing parties. Section I discusses the
American rule not to award litigation expenses absent explicit stat-
utory authority and examines several federal statutes that author-
ize fee shifting. Section II explores the courts' equity power to shift
Inc. v Geo. A. Hormel & Co., 723 F2d 1573, 1578 (Fed Cir 1983) (finding an award of non-
attorney fee expenses was properly within the scope of § 285).
15 111 S Ct 1138 (1991).
Is 42 USC § 1988 (1988) (in actions brought under the Civil Rights Act, "the court, in
its discretion, may allow the prevailing party... a reasonable attorney's fee as part of the
costs").
17 Ill S Ct at 1148.
Is See, for example, Crawford Fitting Co. v J.T. Gibbons, Inc., 482 US 437, 444 (1987).
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litigation expenses and the limited circumstances under which a
court may exercise its equitable discretion. Section III presents the
evolving relationship between the Patent Act's attorney fee shift-
ing provision and the courts' equity power, especially with respect
to the Federal Circuit's treatment of this provision as authority to
shift expert witness fees. This Section concludes that § 285 codifies
all of the courts' "bad faith" equitable fee shifting power and
thereby authorizes courts to award expert witness fees. It ad-
dresses objections to this position and explores the significance of
the Patent Act's legislative and judicial history in light of the Su-
preme Court's reasoning in West Virginia. Section IV outlines the
policy considerations supporting expert witness fee shifting in ex-
ceptional patent cases. The Comment concludes that courts should
still construe § 285 to allow expert witness fee awards in excep-
tional patent cases and specifically that the Supreme Court's ruling
in West Virginia does not overrule this Federal Circuit practice.
I. STATUTORY AUTHORITY FOR AWARDING LITIGATION EXPENSES:
JUDICIAL DEFERENCE TO THE LEGISLATURE
Judicial reluctance to shift litigation fees in the absence of
statutory authority dates back to the late 1700s. 19 Early legislation,
beginning with the Federal Judiciary Act of September 24, 1789,
provided that federal courts were to follow the practice of their
respective states in awarding litigation expenses.20 Many state leg-
islatures either prohibited or limited these awards and, as the Su-
preme Court recently characterized this period, "the Judiciary it-
self would not create a general rule, independent of any statute,
allowing awards of attorney's fees in federal courts."' 21 The federal
courts tended to follow the American rule that parties should bear
their own expenses. 22 The policy behind this practice was, and con-
"' See Alyeska Pipeline Service Co. v Wilderness Society, 421 US 240, 247-50; Rohm &
Haas, 736 F2d at 690.
20 See the Federal Judiciary Act of September 24, 1789, 1 Stat 73, §§ 9, 11-12, 20, 35;
Act of September 29, 1789, 1 Stat 93, § 2, extended by the Act of May 26, 1790, 1 Stat 123,
and again by the Act of February 18, 1791, 1 Stat 191, and repealed by the Act of May 8,
1792, 1 Stat 278, § 8.
21 Alyeska, 421 US at 249.
22 Marek v Chesny, 473 US 1, 8 (1985); Alyeska, 421 US at 247; Hall v Cole, 412 US 1,
4 (1973); Farmer v Arabian American Oil Co., 379 US 227, 235 (1964); Arcambel v Wise-
man, 3 US (3 Dal) 306 (1796).
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tinues to be, "to avoid penalizing a party 'for merely defending or
prosecuting a lawsuit.'",
A. The Fees Act
In response to the inconsistent practice that developed across
the federal courts, Congress standardized the costs and fees recov-
erable in federal litigation.24 By the Fees Act of February 26, 1853,
Congress limited attorney fee awards and gave the district courts
discretion to award a limited category of costs. 5 The substance of
this act eventually appeared in the United States Code in 1946 as
28 USC § 1920.26 Section 1920 includes witness fees among its al-
lowable costs, but § 1821 restricts these costs to $40 for each day's
attendance at trial. 7 The Supreme Court has held that sections
1920 and 1821 limit the reimbursement of fees paid to expert wit-
nesses unless a contract, statute, or exceptional circumstances pro-
vide otherwise.28
B. Specific Provisions. Under Selected Statutes for Attorney's
Fees
In addition to sections 1920 and 1821, Congress has included
attorney and expert witness fee shifting provisions in statutes
granting or protecting specific federal rights. These provisions pro-
" Rohm & Haas, 736 F2d at 690, quoting Fleischman Distilling Corp. v Maier Brewing
Co., 386 US 714, 718 (1967).
" See Cong Globe, 32d Cong, 2d Sess 583-84 (1853) (remarks of Senator Bradbury);
HR Rep No 50, 32d Cong, 1st Sess 1-6 (1852).
25 10 Stat 161 (1853), codified at Rev Stat §§ 823-57 (1873-74). The Act provided that
with respect to witness fees:
For each day's attendance in court, or before any officer pursuant to law, one dollar
and fifty cents, and five cents per mile for travelling from his place of residence to said
place of trial or hearing, and five cents per mile for returning.
Id at 167.
26 62 Stat 955 (1948). Today, the Fees Act provides that "[a] judge or clerk of any court
of the United States may tax as costs the... [flees and disbursements for printing and
witnesses." 28 USC § 1920 (1978).
27 28 USC § 1821 provides:
(a)(1) Except as otherwise provided by law, a witness in attendance at any court of the
United States ... shall be paid the fees and allowances provided by this section.
(b) A witness shall be paid an attendance fee of $40 per day for each day's attendance.
A witness shall also be paid the attendance fee for the time necessarily occupied in
going to and returning from the place of attendance at the beginning and end of such
attendance or at any time during such attendance.
"' West Virginia, 111 S Ct at 1140-41; Crawford, 482 US at 444; Alyeska, 421 US at
257-59.
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vide the only statutory authority for expert fee awards above $40
per day and vary in specificity. Many, including the Patent Act's
fee shifting provision, provide express authority for attorney fee
awards; other more recent statutes also specifically provide for the
recovery of expert witness fees.29
The Supreme Court has acknowledged that even those provi-
sions providing only for attorney fee shifting "differ considerably
among themselves. '30 The Court has explicitly distinguished be-
tween the attorney fee shifting provisions of the Patent Act and
the Civil Rights Act. In patent litigation, "[t]he court in excep-
tional cases may award reasonable attorney fees to the prevailing
party."' In contrast, under the Civil Rights Act "the court, in its
discretion, may allow the prevailing party... a reasonable attor-
ney's fee as part of the costs. '3 2 The Supreme Court, in interpret-
ing the Civil Rights Act, has held that "Congress intended that the
award should be made to the successful plaintiff absent excep-
tional circumstances. 3 3
Thus, the Supreme Court has recognized that different stan-
dards apply to fee shifting under the Patent and Civil Rights Acts.
These standards, resting on the distinctive wording of each act, led
the Court to conclude that, "[u]nder this scheme of things, it is
apparent that the circumstances under which attorneys' fees are to
be awarded and the range of discretion of the courts in making
those awards are matters for Congress to determine. '
's4
II. FEE SHIFTING IN EQUITY
Notwithstanding the requirement of express statutory author-
ity for attorney and expert fee shifting, the district courts have
long exercised their inherent equity power to award litigation ex-
penses to the prevailing party in exceptional circumstances despite
the absence of statutory authorization.
29 Westlaw searches for "expert witness fees" and "fees for expert witness!" uncovered
41 federal statutes that expressly shift expert witness fees in addition to attorney fees. See,
for example, the Equal Access to Justice Act, 28 USC § 2412(d)(2)(A) (1988); the Consumer
Product Safety Act, 15 USC § 2060(c) (1988); the Clean Air Act, 42 USC § 7413(b) (1988);
the Longshore and Harbor Worker's Compensation Act, 33 USC § 928(d) (1988). See gener-
ally West Virginia, 111 S Ct at 1142 n 4 (listing statutes).
20 Alyeska, 421 US at 261.
s' 35 USC § 285 (1988) (emphasis added).
22 Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Awards Act of 1976, 42 USC § 1988 (1988). See also
Title II of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 USC § 2000a-3(b) (1988).
"2 Alyeska, 421 US at 262.
24 Id.
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A. Background
American courts generally have the equity jurisdiction that
was vested in the English Court of Chancery, subject to modifica-
tions by Congress.3 5 This equity power rested largely on the Chan-
cellor's discretion to "act in accordance with the dictates of the
judicial conscience, ' 6 and included the power to give "as much of
the entire expenses of the litigation of one of the parties as fair
justice to the other party will permit . . . ."" The First Judiciary
Act gave the federal courts jurisdiction over suits in equity.3 8 Fol-
lowing the merger of law and equity, all district courts acquired
this equitable discretion unless restricted by statute.3 9
The Supreme Court has recognized both this general equity
power and, specifically, the "power of federal courts in equity suits
to allow counsel fees and other expenses entailed by the litigation
not included in the ordinary taxable costs recognized by statute."40
The Court has concluded that the "[a]llowance of such costs in
appropriate situations is part of the historic equity jurisdiction of
the federal courts,"'41 and includes the power to shift expert wit-
ness fees.42 The Court has strictly limited these awards to "excep-
tional cases" involving "dominating reasons of justice. ' 43
Today the Court recognizes only a few exceptional cases, in-
cluding those in which the losing party has acted "in bad faith,
vexatiously, wantonly, or for oppressive reasons. '44 Thus, while eq-
uity gives courts discretion to shift a broad range of expenses, in-
cluding expert witness fees, only a narrow category of circum-
stances will justify such equitable awards.
35 Sprague v Ticonic National Bank, 307 US 161, 164-65 (1939). See also 27 Am Jur 2d
Equity §§ 5-6 (1966), citing the Federal Judiciary Act of September 24, 1789, 1 Stat 73;
Williamson v Berry, 49 US (8 How) 495, 535-56 (1850); Bodley v Taylor, 9 US (5 Cranch)
191, 222-23 (1809).
31 27 Am Jur 2d Equity § 9.
37 Sprague, 307 US at 165.
31 1 Stat 73, § 11.
31 See Crawford, 482 US at 448 (Marshall dissenting). See generally Sprague, 307 US at
164-65; 27 Am Jur 2d Equity §§ 4-6.
40 Sprague, 307 US at 164.
41 Id.
42 West Virginia, 111 S Ct at 1143-44. See also Welsch v Likins, 68 FRD 589, 596-97 (D
Minn 1975).
43 Sprague, 307 US at 167.
44 F.D. Rich Co., Inc. v United States, 417 US 116, 129 (1974).
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B. Relation of Equity to the Fees Act
Following the Fees Act of 1853, predecessor to 28 USC sec-
tions 1920 and 1821, the Supreme Court considered the Act's effect
on both the types of litigation expenses allowed in equity and the
circumstances justifying the district courts' power to award litiga-
tion costs beyond the amount specified by the statute. In Trustees
v Greenough,4 5 the Court found that the case presented an appro-
priate situation for granting litigation expenses in equity but ex-
pressed doubt about its continuing power to award these expenses
beyond the limits of the Fees Act.4" The Court concluded that the
Fees Act "may have its full effect without being construed to take
away the power of a court of equity to permit counsel fees" where
equitable requirements have been met.47 The Supreme Court later
held that equitable fee shifting beyond the limits of the Fees Act
applied to all litigation expenses, not just attorney fees,48 while
continuing to emphasize that such fee shifting would only be avail-
able in "exceptional cases" or those involving "dominating reasons
of justice."49
The Court has considered the appropriateness of the circum-
stances justifying equitable fee shifting on a case-by-case basis. For
example, the Court has permitted cost recovery upon finding
"obstinate noncompliance with the law or the use of the judicial proc-
ess for purposes of harassment or delay in affording rights clearly
owed.'50 It frequently justified such decisions on the grounds that
the defendant's actions have forced the plaintiff to act as "private
attorneys general." 51 This type of recovery occurred most often in
civil rights cases where plaintiffs were forced to incur substantial
costs to secure constitutional rights.52 In addition, the Court has
allowed equitable fee shifting where the losing party acted in bad
faith.5 3
The Court's limited application of equitable fee shifting pre-
vented equity from swallowing the Fees Act entirely. In a further
-5 105 US 527 (1881).
46 Id at 535.
47 Id.
41 Sprague, 307 US 161.
" Id at 167.
50 Bradley v School Board of The City of Richmond, 416 US 696, 706 (1974).
5 Id at 708. See also Northcross v Board of Education of Memphis City Schools, 412
US 427, 428 (1973); Newman v Piggie Park Enterprises, Inc., 390 US 400, 402 (1968).
52 Bradley, 416 US at 719-20 & n 27.
" See, for example, Hall v Cole, 412 US 1, 5 (1973); Universal Oil Products Co. v Root
Refining Co., 328 US 575, 580 (1946); F. D. Rich, 417 US at 129.
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effort to protect the Fees Act, the Supreme Court in 1975 imposed
even stricter limits on the circumstances allowing equitable fee
shifting. Acknowledging in Alyeska Pipeline Service v Wilderness
Society" that the fee statutes have been construed to allow equita-
ble fee shifting beyond statutory limits in certain cases, the Court
restricted equitable fee awards to three situations: (1) "to permit
the trustee of a fund or property, or a party preserving or recover-
ing a fund for the benefit of others in addition to himself, to re-
cover his costs"; (2) to allow recovery of fees for the willful disobe-
dience of a court order; or (3) to allow recovery of fees "when the
losing party has 'acted in bad faith, vexatiously, wantonly, or for
oppressive reasons . . . . " 5 Although the decision has been criti-
cized for restricting the circumstances in which a district court
could shift fees in equity to "immaterial exceptions,' 5 6 it did not
restrict the types of expenses traditionally shifted in equity.
These limitations on equitable fee shifting play an important
role in shaping the district courts' continuing equitable authority
to shift expenses, including expert fees, especially in light of the
Supreme Court's holding in Crawford Fitting Co. v J. T. Gib-
bons.57 One interpretation of Crawford might suggest that equity
no longer allows expert witness fee shifting beyond the limits of
the Fees Act. In Crawford, the Court held that "absent explicit
statutory or contractual authorization for the taxation of the ex-
penses of a litigant's [expert] witnesses as costs, federal courts are
bound by the limitations set out in 28 USC § 1821 and § 1920.''51
Crawford reaffirmed Henkel v Chicago, St. Paul, Minneapolis &
Omaha Ry. Co.,59 decided fifty-five years earlier, in which the
Court held that federal courts could not award expert witness fees
in excess of the limit imposed by the Fees Act of 1853.60 The Court
decided Henkel before the merger of law and equity, and it did not
consider whether equity would allow such an award.
54 421 US 240 (1975).
15 Id at 257-59.
66 Friedrich v City of Chicago, 888 F2d 511, 518 (7th Cir 1989), cert granted and judg-
ment vacated by 111 S Ct 1383 (1991).
57 482 US 437 (1987).
58 482 US at 445. Note that Crawford did not expressly rule that attorney fee shifting
provisions do not provide the requisite authority. Although most federal courts of appeals
have interpreted Crawford to disallow expert witness fee recovery as part of an attorney's
fee award, see E. Richard Larson, Recent Developments in the Law of Attorneys' Fees,
C517 ALI-ABA 711, 815 (1990), the Supreme Court did not expressly address this issue
until it decided West Virginia.
59 284 US 444 (1932).
60 Id at 446-47.
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While neither Crawford nor Henkel allowed the petitioner to
shift expert witness fees in equity, neither opinion demonstrated
appropriate exceptional circumstances that would warrant such eq-
uitable discretion. While the Court in Crawford rejected the peti-
tioner's assertion that Henkel had neglected equitable fee shifting
only because it was decided before the merger of law and equity,
Henkel's decision comports entirely with the simple lack of equita-
ble circumstances. Thus, the recovery of expert witness fees in "ex-
ceptional" cases does not conflict with Crawford's or Henkel's rea-
soning. Notably, the Court in Crawford repeatedly cited its
decision in Alyeska with approval and again rejected the same as-
sertion posited and rejected there, namely that "courts sitting in
equity ha[ve] broad discretion to award fees not specified by stat-
ute.""' Explicitly relying on Alyeska's holding that this discretion
does not extend beyond a few exceptional circumstances, Crawford
denied that Congress extended any "roving authority" to the
courts to allow litigation expenses "whenever the courts might
deem them warranted. '6 2
Thus, the Supreme Court did not deny that the district courts
have equitable authority to shift expert witness fees beyond the
limits of the Fees Act. Rather, the Court's failure to acknowledge
equitable expert fee shifting in Crawford and Henkel demonstrates
equity's limitation to certain exceptional circumstances that did
not exist in those cases. Crawford and Henkel merely illustrate the
limits on the appropriate circumstances for equitable fee shifting.
Just as the requirement for exceptional circumstances recon-
ciles Crawford and Henkel with Alyeska's acknowledgement of eq-
uitable fee shifting, it also reconciles West Virginia's denial of ex-
pert witness fees under the Civil Rights Act with the Federal
Circuit's award of these fees under § 285 of the Patent Act. Like
equity, but unlike the Civil Rights Act, § 285 strictly limits the
circumstances that warrant fee shifting. In fact, § 285's limitations
on the circumstances permitting fee shifting are nearly identical to
the "bad faith" prong of the equitable fee shifting standard im-
posed by Alyeska. This common restriction forms the basis of the
strong relationship between equity and § 285, and distinguishes
§ 285 from the attorney fee shifting provision of the Civil Rights
Act.
01 Crawford, 482 US at 443.
02 Id at 444, quoting Alyeska, 421 US at 260.
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III. CONGRESS'S INTENT TO CODIFY EQUITY IN § 285 AS JUSTIFICA-
TION FOR AWARDING EXPERT WITNESS FEES
The codification of equitable principles in § 285 strongly sug-
gests that Congress incorporated the authority to award all litiga-
tion expenses recoverable in equity. In particular, the parallel cir-
cumstances allowing fee shifting under equity's bad faith standard
and § 285 strengthen the assertion that § 285 also parallels the
types of fees awardable in equity. Section 285, like its equity paral-
lel, therefore includes the authority to shift expert witness fees.
A. Identical Standards for "Exceptional Cases" in Equity and
§ 285
The judicial treatment of § 285 demonstrate that the bad faith
prong of the equitable circumstances outlined in Alyeska is identi-
cal to that adopted for the award of fees under § 285. Courts have
consistently held that the applicable standard for determining
whether a case is "exceptional" under § 285, with concomitant fee
shifting, is "whether there is a showing of unfairness or bad faith
in the conduct of the losing party, or any other equitable consider-
ation of similar force which makes it grossly unfair that the winner
of the lawsuit be left to bear the burden of his own counsel fees. '63
Using this narrow standard, the Federal Circuit has limited at-
torney and expert fee shifting under § 285 to cases involving such
circumstances as willful infringement," fraud in procuring the pat-
ent,6 5 misconduct during the suit,6 6 persistence with a suit knowing
that the asserted patent is invalid6 7 or "'unfairness, bad faith, or
inequitable conduct'" on the part of a patentee asserting infringe-
ment.18 Furthermore, the court has consistently required the party
13 Crown Machine and Tool Co. v KVP-Sutherland Paper Co., 297 F Supp 542, 577 (N
D Cal 1968), aft'd, 409 F2d 1307 (9th Cir 1969). See also Codex Corp. v Milgo Electronic
Corp., 541 F Supp 1198, 1201 (D Mass 1982); PPG Industries v Celanese Polymer Special-
ties, 658 F Supp 555, 558-59 (W D Ky 1987), rev'd on other grounds, 840 F2d 1565 (Fed Cir
1988); Campbell v Spectrum Automation Co., 601 F2d 246, 251 (6th Cir 1979).
" Rohm & Haas, 736 F2d at 693, citing Rosemount, Inc. v Beckman Instruments Inc.,
727 F2d 1540 (Fed Cir 1984) and Lam, Inc. v Johns-Mansville Corp., 718 F2d 1056 (Fed Cir
1983).
" Rohm & Haas, 736 F2d at 693.
66 Id.
67 Id.
68 Id, quoting Stevenson v Sears, Roebuck and Co., 713 F2d 705, 713 (Fed Cir 1983).
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requesting fee shifting under § 285 to present strong evidence that
the case is exceptional.6 9
The Federal Circuit has noted the strong similarity between
§ 285 and the district courts' inherent equity power to shift costs
in certain circumstances, though it has never explained its signifi-
cance. In Rohm & Haas v Crystal Chemical Co.,"0 the court cited
§ 285 and its predecessor as examples of "statutory provisions
[that] have been enacted so as to further equitable considerations.
. .for the purpose of enabling a court to prevent gross injustice."
When the Federal Circuit addressed the issue of expert witness fee
shifting in Mathis, it based its award of expert fees squarely upon
its inherent equity power as codified in § 285."'
The Federal Circuit has not always cited the relationship be-
tween § 285 and equitable principles to justify its awards of expert
witness fees. In fact, the court's treatment of § 285 has evolved
since the court's inception in 1982. In the early years of the court,
it based its award of expert fees under § 285 on its interpretation
that attorney's fees "include those sums that the prevailing party
incurs in the preparation for and performance of legal services re-
lated to the suit. '7 2
The Supreme Court's perspective on this issue became signifi-
cant when in West Virginia it rejected the original justification of
expert witness fee awards as an element of attorney's fees. Before
that ruling, the Federal Circuit had found it unnecessary to justify
expert fee awards on equitable grounds. After West Virginia, how-
ever, the circuit court's reference to § 285's equitable background
remains the only viable justification for expert witness fee awards.
If § 285 is merely a shorthand codification of the courts' inherent
equitable fee shifting power, as the Federal Circuit suggested in
Rohm & Haas, then this statutory power should include the au-
thority to shift all fees awardable in equity, including expert wit-
ness fees.
9 CTS Corp. v Piher International Corp., 727 F2d 1550, 1564-65 (Fed Cir 1984) (attor-
ney fees denied because opposing party's motions were neither exceptional nor in bad faith);
-Orthopedic Equipment Co. v All Orthopedic Appliances, Inc., 707 F2d 1376, 1384 (Fed Cir
1983); Stickle v Heublein, Inc., 716 F2d 1550, 1555 (Fed Cir 1983). See also Gary M. Ropski
and Marc S. Cooperman, Damages in USA Intellectual Property Litigation, 72 J Pat Off
Soc'y 181, 192-98 (1990); Ronald B. Cooney, Obtaining Attorney's Fees for Corporate Pat-
ent Counsel's Assistance in Litigation, 72 J Pat Off Soc'y 212, 214-15 (1990).
" 736 F2d 688, 690 (Fed Cir 1984).
7' 857 F2d at 759.
72 Central Soya, 723 F2d at 1578. See also Lam, 718 F2d at 1069.
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B. Objections to the Argument that Congress Intended § 285 to
Authorize Expert Fee Shifting
This reasoning presents several difficulties. If the courts have
residual equity power to shift all litigation expenses in exceptional
circumstances outside of any statutory authority, then § 285, which
simply provides statutory authority to award attorney's fees in
these same "exceptional" cases, is redundant. Because the stan-
dard for § 285 and equitable fee shifting are identical, a case in
bad faith that triggers the award of attorney's fees under § 285
should automatically trigger equitable shifting of expert fees.7 3
This redundancy suggests that awarding litigation expenses under
§ 285 is unnecessary; on finding a case to be exceptional, the court
could award these fees under its residual equity power.
The legislative and judicial background of § 285 provides the
crucial framework for understanding the necessary and distinct
role that § 285 serves in patent cases. In effect, Congress enacted
§ 285 in response to the judiciary's removal of equitable fee shift-
ing from patent litigation. Thus, Congress intended § 285 to re-
store rather than to fortify equitable fee shifting, including the au-
thority to shift expert witness fees, to exceptional patent cases.
1. Judicial and legislative background-no equitable fee
shifting in patent cases.
The judicial background against which Congress enacted the
fee shifting provision of the Patent Act differs remarkably from
that of fee shifting statutes in other areas of the law. Prior to 1946,
the damages recoverable by statute in patent infringement cases
did not include attorney's fees, 4 and the Supreme Court had held
that the award of attorney's fees in equity was not available in pat-
ent cases. 5
In Day v Woodworth,76 decided two years before the Fees Act
limited litigation fee awards, the Court stated that the patent laws
authorized neither the court nor the jury to award litigation fees in
"s The Fifth Circuit awarded both expert and attorney fees in equity in a patent in-
fringement case. See Kinnear-Weed Corp. v Humble Oil & Refining Co., 441 F2d 631, 636-
37 (5th Cir 1971).
71 See the Patent Act of July 4, 1836, 5 Stat 117, 123 § 14.
75 See Day v Woodworth, 54 US (13 How) 363, 372-73 (1851); Teese v Huntingdon, 64
US (23 How) 2, 8-9 (1859) (no expenses awarded because Patent Act of July 4, 1836 already
provided for treble damages for bad faith); Philp v Nock, 84 US (17 Wall) 460, 462 (1873);
Parks v Booth, 102 US 96, 107 (1880).
76 54 US at 372.
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equity, even if "the defendant has not acted in good faith, or has
been stubbornly litigious, or has caused unnecessary expense and
trouble to the plaintiff." The Court reasoned that the patent laws
already allowed the district courts to treble the actual damages
where the defendant had acted in bad faith.77 Allowing an addi-
tional equitable award of counsel fees would inflict a double pen-
alty on the defendant.8
Although Day was an action in trespass, and the above reason-
ing dicta, the Court subsequently held in a patent case, Teese v
Huntingdon,9 that even where the defendant acted in bad faith,
"[c]ounsel fees are not a proper element for the consideration of
the jury in the estimation of damages in actions for the infringe-
ment of a patent right." Thus, the Supreme Court effectively re-
moved patent cases from the reach of equitable shifting of attor-
ney's fees. Although it used the term "counsel fees" instead of
"litigation expenses," the Court's strong reliance on Day and its
interchangeable use of "counsel fees" and "litigation expenses" or
"costs" throughout the opinions discussing equitable fee shifting
suggests that Teese signalled a complete removal of equitable fee
shifting from patent cases.
2. Congress's intent to restore equitable fee shifting in the
Patent Act's attorney fee shifting provision.
Against this judicial background in 1946, Congress enacted a
provision to allow recovery of attorney's fees in patent cases. The
original attorney fee shifting provision of the Patent Act 80 stated
that a "court may in its discretion award reasonable attorney's fees
to the prevailing party upon the entry of judgment on any patent
case." 8' This codification of an attorney fee shifting power was not
redundant because Teese had established that district courts had
no equitable discretion to award "counsel fees" prior to its
enactment.
a) A literal approach. The use of the terms "counsel fees"
and "attorney's fees" rather than "litigation expenses" in Teese
and in § 70 suggests another argument for the continued shifting
71 Id, referring to 5 Stat 123, now codified at 35 USC § 284 (1988) ("the'court may
increase the damages up to three times the amount found or assessed").
7s Id at 372-73.
7 64 US at 8-9, citing Day, 54 US at 372.
80 35 USC § 70 (1946).
81 Act of August 1, 1946, 60 Stat 778, codified at 35 USC § 70 (1946).
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of expert fees in exceptional patent cases. The Supreme Court's
use of the term "counsel fees" in Teese removed only equitable
attorney fee shifting from patent cases and left other litigation fee
shifting alone. The restoration of "attorney fee" shifting in § 70
would then reflect a specific and exact reversal of the precedent set
in Teese, restoring only equitable attorney fee shifting. By this rea-
soning, equitable expert fee shifting has always been and would
still be allowed in patent cases, and remains unaffected by both
Teese and § 285.
While this interpretation leads to the same result posited by
this Comment-courts may continue to award expert witness fees
in exceptional patent cases even after West Virginia-this inter-
pretation may be criticized as excessively literal. A broader reading
of the term "attorney's fees" in both Teese and § 70 seems to com-
port more closely with the likely intents of both the courts and
Congress. Even so, under the literalist interpretations, courts may
nevertheless award expert fees in their discretion beyond the limits
of the Fees Act in the same circumstances warranting fee shifting
under § 285 and its predecessor, § 70.
b) Congressional intent. The strongest evidence that Con-
gress's original enactment of § 70 did not reflect its equitable un-
derpinnings arises from its failure to specify the limited circum-
stances in which Congress intended it to apply. Despite the liberal
wording of § 70, which allowed the court to award fees "in its dis-
cretion," Congress did not intend it as a broad grant of authority
to award attorney's fees in all possible circumstances. Although the
Patent Act's original grant of authority was not expressly limited
to exceptional cases, the Senate Report stated:
It is not contemplated that the recovery of attorney's fees will
become an ordinary thing in patent suits, but the discretion
given the court in this respect, in addition to the present dis-
cretion to award triple damages, will discourage infringement
of a patent by anyone thinking that all he would be required
to pay if he loses the suit would be a royalty. The provision is
made general so as to enable the court to prevent a gross in-
justice to an alleged infringer.82
8' S Rep No 1503, 79th Cong, 2d Sess (1946) in 1946 USCCS 1386, 1387. Note that
Congress intended attorney fees to bolster the already existing discretion to grant treble
damages in bad faith cases. Congress thereby implicitly rejected the Supreme Court's rea-
soning in Day that an award of attorney fees, in addition to treble damages, would unfairly
overpenalize the losing party. See Day, 54 US at 372.
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Unfortunately, Congress was less clear in drafting the statute
than it was in the accompanying reports and discussions. The leg-
islative history suggests that Congress intended to limit the au-
thority to grant litigation fees to special cases involving "gross in-
justice," a restriction embodying principles of equity. These same
equitable principles historically included the authority to shift all
litigation expenses, including expert witness fees,8 3 in limited cir-
cumstances. It seems likely, therefore, that Congress intended this
statute to restore the courts' entire equitable fee shifting authority,
not only the authority to shift attorney's fees.
Following the enactment of § 70, courts recognized the provi-
sion's equitable underpinnings and demonstrated a willingness to
follow Congress's underlying intent rather than a strict wording of
the act. Instead of allowing fee shifting "upon the entry of judg-
ment on any patent case, 's4 as the statute by its plain language
suggested, the courts interpreted this provision to allow fee shift-
ing "primarily upon findings of extraordinary circumstances."85
Later, Congress approved the court's interpretation of the
statute by codifying this reading. When it revised this provision in
the Patent Act of 1952, Congress explicitly required the case to be
"exceptional" to comply with "the intention of the present statute
as shown by its legislative history and as interpreted by the
courts. 8s6 The exceptional cases requirement in § 285 provides
strong evidence that Congress in 1952 recognized its equitable
background and intended the provision more clearly to codify eq-
uitable principles.
The context of the 1952 revision supports the claim that Con-
gress intended the statute to allow fee shifting only in cases in
which equitable fee shifting would be justified. In contrast, Con-
gress refrained from clarifying the statute's ambiguity regarding
the types of fees authorized to match those in equity. Until West
Virginia, such clarification was unnecessary. The Federal Circuit,
recognizing the provision's equitable characteristics, interpreted it
83 See Friedrich, 888 F2d at 518; West Virginia, 111 S Ct at 1143-44.
84 35 USC § 70 (1946).
85 Rohm & Haas, 736 F2d at 691. As the Ninth Circuit explained:
The exercise of discretion in favor of such an allowance should be bottomed upon a
finding of unfairness or bad faith in the conduct of the losing party, or some other
equitable consideration of similar force, which makes it grossly unjust that the winner
of the particular law suit be left to bear the burden of his own counsel fees which the
prevailing litigants normally bear.
Park-In Theatres v Perkins, 190 F2d 137, 142 (9th Cir 1951).
86 S Rep No 1979, 82d Cong, 2d Sess (1952), in 1952 USCCAN 2394, 2423.
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to authorize all litigation expenses awardable in equity, including
expert witness fees. Further statutory modification will remain un-
necessary if the district courts are permitted to continue their
present interpretation of legislative intent.
3. Congress's silence with respect to expert witness fees in
§ 285.
Before Congress enacted the Patent Act's fee shifting provi-
sion, the Supreme Court had removed patent cases from the reach
of equitable fee shifting. Through § 285, Congress restored this fee
shifting authority to patent cases. However, Congress's silence with
respect to expert witness fees in § 285 might suggest that Congress
intended to exclude expert witness fees from its restoration of the
courts' equitable fee shifting power.
West Virginia made clear that the Supreme Court will rarely
read into a statute what Congress has omitted. As the Court
stated:
[T]he purpose of a statute includes not only what it sets out
to change, but also what it resolves to leave alone. The best
evidence of that purpose is the statutory text adopted by both
Houses of Congress and submitted to the President ...
"[W]here, as here, the statute's language is plain, 'the sole
function of the court is to enforce it according to its terms.' M7
Part of the Supreme Court's analysis in West Virginia addressed
the statutory usage of the terms "attorney's fees" and "expert wit-
ness fees" just prior to 1976, when Congress enacted the civil rights
statute at issue in that case. In particular, Congress passed the
Civil Rights Act in the years following the enactment of several
other laws that specifically provided for the award of expert fees,
separate from attorney's fees."" The Court concluded that "Con-
gress could easily have shifted 'attorney's fees and expert witness
fees,' or 'reasonable litigation expenses,' as it did in contemporane-
ous statutes; it chose instead to enact more restrictive language,
and we are bound by that restriction." 8
Yet, the meaning of "attorney's fees" in 1946, the year Con-
gress enacted the fee shifting provision of the Patent Act, differed
considerably from its use in 1976. In 1946, Congress had not yet
'7 West Virginia, 111 S Ct at 1147, quoting United States v Ron Pair Enterprises, 489
US 235, 241 (1989) (citations omitted).
s Id at 1142.
89 Id at 1147.
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demonstrated a distinction between attorney and expert witness
fees under specific statutes outside the Fees Act. The few acts that
provided costs to the prevailing party specified attorney's fees and
did not list expert fees separately.90 Thus, to the extent that West
Virginia turned on Congress's demonstrated recognition of expert
witness fees as an expense separate from attorney's fees in 1976,
the Court's conclusions are largely inapplicable to §. 285.
Congress's increasingly frequent use of the term "expert wit-
ness fees" in the past twenty-five years correlates with the judici-
ary's increasing use and recognition of expert testimony. Given the
current importance of expert witnesses to patent litigation,91 Con-
gress's failure to consider including the term "expert witness fees"
in a statute enacted today would be determinative. But when Con-
gress enacted § 285 in 1946, expert witness testimony played a
much smaller role in litigation, even in technical and scientific
cases, and expert witness fees did not approach their current mag-
nitude."2 Given the limited use of experts in the 1940s, it is not
suprising that Congress did not separately acknowledge expert wit-
ness fees in its drafting of § 285, but rather intended that the term
"attorney's fees" encompass these and all other necessary litigation
fees.
4. Distinction from the argument rejected in West Virginia.
The final and most serious objection to the proposal that Con-
gress intended § 285 to permit the shifting of all fees authorized in
equity is that the Supreme Court rejected similar reasoning by the
Seventh Circuit in Friedrich. The Supreme Court vacated Fried-
rich, which allowed expert witness fee shifting under the attorney
fee shifting provision of the Civil Rights Act, in light of its ruling
in West Virginia. In Friedrich, Judge Posner of the Seventh Cir-
cuit reasoned that Congress used "'reasonable attorney's fee' as a
shorthand expression for such fees and other expenses as the dis-
trict court might in the exercise of its equitable discretion reasona-
90 See, for example, the Interstate Commerce Act of 1887 § 8, 24 Stat 379, 382; Clayton
Act of 1914 § 4, 38 Stat 730, 731, codified at 15 USC § 15 (1988); Copyright Act § 40, 35 Stat
1075, 1084, codified at 17 USC § 40 (1946).
91 Conley, 15 AIPLA at 386 (cited in note 1) ("... in almost every [patent]. case expert
opinions will be necessary").
92 See also Singer Manufacturing Co. v Cramer, 192 US 265, 275 (1904) ("As in each of
the patents in question it is apparent from the face of the instrument that extrinsic evi-
dence is not needed to explain the terms of art therein, or to apply the descriptions to the
subject matter .... ). For a contemporary opinion about the use of experts in the 1940s, see
Leon R. Yankewich, On the Use of Experts in Patent Cases, 22 J Pat Off Soc'y 639 (1940).
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bly believe should be reimbursed to the prevailing party. ' 93 The
Supreme Court, however, rejected the assertion that the Civil
Rights Act codified equitable power to shift expert fees.' 4
The Supreme Court also rejected a related argument offered
by the plaintiff in West Virginia. The plaintiff argued that "attor-
ney's fees" in § 1988 of the Civil Rights Act should include expert
witness fees because Congress enacted this provision to restore the
broader equitable fee shifting power that existed before the Su-
preme Court's severe restrictions in Alyeska. In particular, Aly-
eska had rejected the "private attorneys general" doctrine, which
had allowed equitable fee shifting in situations especially common
in civil rights cases.9 The plaintiff in West Virginia argued "that
§ 1988 was intended to restore the pre-Alyeska regime-and since
expert fees were shifted then, they should be shifted now."96
The Court rejected this argument with respect to the Civil
Rights Act. Conceding that the legislative history of § 1988 "sug-
gest[s] that at least some members of Congress viewed it as a re-
sponse to Alyeska," the Court wrote that "[i]t is a considerable
step, however, from this proposition to the conclusion ... that §
1988 should be read as a reversal of Alyeska in all respects."," The
position that § 1988 restores pre-Alyeska equity power in civil
rights cases is similar in many respects to the proposal that the
Patent Act's fee shifting provision, § 285, restores courts' equity
power to shift litigation expenses in patent cases, as it existed
before Day and Teese.
Nevertheless, fundamental differences in the evolving relation-
ships between equity and the Patent and Civil Rights Acts distin-
guish the argument here from the arguments advanced in Fried-
rich and West Virginia. In both patent and civil rights cases,
equity originally allowed courts relatively broad discretion to shift
attorney and expert fees in a variety of circumstances.9 8 Day and
Teese directly removed patent cases from the reach of equity. 9
Alyeska limited the circumstances justifying equitable fee shifting
in all areas of the law, including civil rights, to three exceptional
circumstances discussed in Section II.B.
93 888 F2d at 518.
9' 111 S Ct 1383, vacating and remanding for reconsideration in light of West Virginia,
111 S Ct 1138.
See text accompanying notes 51-52.
. 111 S Ct at 1146.
97 Id.
98 See Section II.A.
99 See text accompanying notes 76-79.
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Although equitable fee shifting still applies to exceptional civil
rights cases, Alyeska had severely limited the circumstances under
which the courts could exercise this authority. In response to Aly-
eska, and to restore some of the broader equitable discretion that
had existed before 1975, Congress enacted the fee shifting provi-
sion of the Civil Rights Act to allow courts to shift attorney's fees
in their discretion. In a Senate Committee Report, Congress stated
that "[t]his bill creates no startling new remedy-it only meets the
technical requirements that the Supreme Court has laid down if
the Federal courts are to continue the practice of awarding attor-
neys' fees which had been going on for years prior to the Court's
[Alyeska] decision." 00 In Friedrich, the Seventh Circuit argued
that "reasonable attorney's fees" was shorthand for the fees al-
lowed in equity before Alyeska, which included expert witness
fees: "The term [reasonable attorney's fees] is the label for a power
first asserted, then withheld, and finally restored; it is not an ex-
haustive description of the power."''1
The Supreme Court rejected this assertion that the Civil
Rights Act restored full equitable fee shifting because, "[b]y its
plain language and as unanimously construed in the courts, § 1988
is both broader and narrower than the pre-Alyeska regime.' 10 2 It is
broader because equitable fee shifting even before Alyeska was re-
stricted to particular circumstances, such as those defining the
"private attorneys general" doctrine. In other words, equity had
not permitted fee shifting in the court's discretion absent these cir-
cumstances. By allowing fee shifting in the courts' discretion,
§ 1988 "restored" a power much broader than that which had orig-
inally existed.
Section 1988, the Court explained, was in other respects nar-
rower than the pre-Alyeska regime. Before 1975, broader equitable
fee shifting had existed in almost all legal areas. Alyeska had lim-
ited equity's reach in these areas, yet the attorney fee shifting pro-
vision of the Civil Rights Act applied only to civil rights cases. It
did not restore the broader pre-Alyeska fee shifting regime to all
legal issues, but only to civil rights cases. 0 3 Thus, despite Con-
gress's apparent intentions, § 1988 created a new equitable fee
shifting system that did not mirror the system that had existed
100 S Rep No 94-1011, 94th Cong, 2d Sess 6 (1976), in 1976 USCCAN 5908, 5913. See
also Friedrich, 888 F2d at 518.
'0 888 F2d at 518.
102 West Virginia, 111 S Ct at 1146.
103 Id.
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before Alyeska. Rather, with respect to the narrow civil rights
area, § 1988 created a broader fee shifting authority than that pre-
viously justified in equity. As the Court stated, "[s]ince it is clear
that, in many respects, § 1988 was not meant to return us precisely
to the pre-Alyeska regime, the objective of achieving such a return
is no reason to depart from the normal import of the text. '10 4
The objections that led the Court to reject the equitable fee
shifting argument in West Virginia do not apply to the Patent Act
for two reasons. First, the Patent Act did not restore a broader
authority than equity originally had allowed. Congress restricted
the Patent Act's attorney fee shifting provision to "exceptional
cases" to reflect its intent that the provision mirror equitable fee
shifting. Rather than attempting to fortify equity's existing scope
by eliminating its restrictive standard, as it did with the Civil
Rights Act, Congress enacted § 285 of the Patent Act to reestablish
equitable fee shifting, with the concomitant limitations, in an area
where courts had said there was no equitable fee shifting at all.105
Moreover, unlike the civil rights context, courts have interpreted
and applied § 285 to allow fee shifting only where it would be al-
lowed in equity.
Second, the provision was no narrower than the situation it
attempted to restore. The Civil Rights Act had too narrowly re-
sponded to Alyeska, a broad case limiting equity in all legal areas,
but the Patent Act responded to cases that were themselves lim-
ited to patents. Just as Day and Teese had removed only patent
cases from equity's reach, so the Patent Act restored equitable fee
shifting only to patent cases. In this respect § 285 responded di-
rectly and precisely to the judiciary's removal of patent cases from
equity's reach, while accepting equity's restrictions. Section 1988
did not.
West Virginia's rejection of the equitable fee shifting argu-
ment, though understandable in the Civil Rights Act's context,
finds no support in the context of the Patent Act. Section 285's
incorporation of equitable fee shifting principles is supported by
its legislative history, its restriction to "exceptional cases," the ad-
mitted purpose of its 1952 revision to better reflect the provision's
intent, and the use of the term "attorney's fees" in the context of
equitable fee shifting at the time of its drafting. These factors to-
gether support the proposition that Congress intended § 285 to re-
104 Id.
100 See text accompanying notes 76-79.
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store all equitable fee shifting to patent cases and implicitly in-
cluded the authority to shift expert witness fees.
IV. POLICY CONSIDERATIONS SUPPORTING EXPERT FEE SHIFTING IN
EXCEPTIONAL PATENT CASES
Policy considerations strengthen the conclusion that courts
should continue to construe § 285 to shift expert witness fees along
with attorney's fees in exceptional patent cases. Commentators
have recognized that the allocation of litigation costs may affect
the behavior of parties in resolving disputes.10 e A brief economic
analysis will illustrate that expert witness fee shifting in excep-
tional patent cases helps to discourage frivolous, bad faith lawsuits.
A. Discouraging Bad Faith Patent Suits Through Expert Witness
Fee Shifting
By shifting expert witness fees under § 285, courts achieve two
distinct policy goals: they deter bad faith patent suits and en-
courage otherwise reluctant plaintiffs to bring valid claims. This is
because, in general, the allocation of litigation expenses, such as
expert witness fees, affects the plaintiff's decision to assert a legal
claim. 10 7 Plaintiffs assert legal claims when they expect their recov-
ery to exceed their costs.10 8 The higher the expected costs of losing
relative to the expected judgment, the less likely the plaintiff is to
bring suit.
A fee shifting provision like § 285 effectively discourages bad
faith lawsuits by increasing the expected costs involved in such
suits. The spiteful plaintiff, filing a suit designed more to harass
opponents that to secure a just reward, will find his expected costs
higher in a system of fee shifting because he must anticipate the
risk of paying his opponent's legal or expert fees in addition to his
own. This decreases the plaintiff's expected judgment relative to
'06 This discussion is based largely on Robert D. Cooter and Daniel L. Rubinfeld, Eco-
nomic Analysis of Legal Disputes and Their Resolution, 27 J Econ Lit 1067 (1989) and
Steven Shavell, Suit, Settlement, and Trial: A Theoretical Analysis Under Alternative
Methods for the Allocation of Legal Costs, 11 J Legal Stud 55 (1982). These articles ex-
amine the effect on dispute resolution of various allocations of litigation costs as a general
package of expenses, without distinguishing between different types of expenses or areas of
the law. Shavell notes, "conclusions can be drawn in particular areas of litigation." Shavell,
11 J Legal Stud at 71.
107 Shavell, 11 J Legal Stud at 56.
"'I More precisely, the plaintiff's estimated judgment discounted by his probability of
winning must be greater than his anticipated legal costs plus the anticipated shiftable legal
costs of his opponent, discounted by his probability of losing. See id at 57-60.
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his expected costs and makes the plaintiff less likely to bring
suit. 09
Conversely, where the plaintiff believes she has a strong case,
the frequency of suits will be greater under a system of litigation
fee shifting than under a system where parties bear their own
costs.1 0 This is true because the optimistic plaintiff anticipates
that her legal costs may be shifted to her losing opponent, thereby
decreasing the plaintiff's expected costs relative to her expected
judgment."' In other words, a patent holder who is optimistic
about her claim will be more likely to bring an infringement suit
against a competitor if she anticipates that her competitor will pay
her expert witness fees than if the patent holder knows that, win
or lose, she is certain to pay the high cost of her own experts.
Of course, some incentive problems may arise under a fee
shifting regime. For example, advocates of the American rule often
justify not shifting fees by observing that shifting expenses dis-
courages the litigation of doubtful, yet potentially meritorious,
claims by penalizing the losing party."2 Where the plaintiff is not
optimistic about winning, the frequency of suits will be greater
under a system where parties bear their own costs than under one
where the loser pays the winner's expenses. This occurs because
the plaintiff's litigation costs are constant in the first case, with the
plaintiff paying only his own expert witness fees, regardless of the
suit's outcome; but in a system of fee shifting, the pessimistic
plaintiff anticipates paying his opponent's expert fees in addition
to his own. The prospect of paying an opponent's expert fees may
discourage a plaintiff with a doubtful, but valid, patent infringe-
ment claim from bringing suit against a competitor.
There are two reasons why this argument does not undercut
fee shifting in all cases. First, the recent litigation explosion calls
this argument into question. Discouraging some suits may now be
advantageous. Second, a fee shifting provision like § 285 avoids
the deterrence of valid claimants, because it applies only in excep-
tional cases. Hence, it aims to discourage only those pessimistic
parties who assert claims or defenses in bad faith.""
0, Id at 59-60 & n 19.
1 0 Id at 59.
11 Id.
"2 Alan M. Ahart, Attorneys' Fees: The Patent Experience, 57 J Pat Off Soc'y 608, 609
(1975); Note, Attorney's Fees as an Element of Damages, 15 U Cin L Rev 313, 315 & n 10
(1941). See also Charles T. McCormick, Counsel Fees and Other Expenses of Litigation as
an Element of Damages, 15 Minn L Rev 619, 638-42 (1931).
' Ahart, 57 J Pat Off Soc'y at 611-12 (cited in note 112).
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Ultimately, the benefits of fee shifting depend on the social
desirability of encouraging or discouraging litigation in different
contexts.114 In the context of patent litigation, Congress and the
courts have long accepted that awarding attorney's fees under
§ 285 strikes the proper balance of interests. Although the margi-
nal effects of shifting expert fees in addition to attorney's fees may
not coincide precisely with the original effects of shifting only at-
torney's fees, the incentive would be the same.
B. Fairness
The restriction of fee shifting to bad faith cases effects a sec-
ond normative policy consideration: fairness. Litigation fee shifting
is often justified by the principle that a prevailing party should not
have to bear the "loss" of his legal costs.1" In other words, a pat-
ent holder who wins an infringement suit against a competitor
should not have to pay the expenses of proving infringement. This
presumes that the prevailing party advances the "morally supe-
rior" position and that the losing party is somehow "blamewor-
thy."1 6 It seems unfair to penalize the losing party for merely de-
fending himself or asserting a tenable but unsuccessful claim. Fee
shifting may thereby discourage parties from asserting doubtful
claims and defenses that courts would later find to have merit.
The Patent Act's attorney fee shifting provision overcomes
this criticism by applying only to "exceptional" cases. It does not
reach parties with fair and justifiable claims. The policy behind the
provision is itself based in equity and in preventing injustice to the
prevailing party." 7 Thus, just as a fairness consideration supports
attorney fee shifting to bad faith litigants, it also supports shifting
all other litigation expenses, including expert witness fees.
C. Administrative Costs
Discouraging bad faith patent litigation through expert wit-
ness fee shifting may outweigh its administrative costs. If such fee
shifting in fact prevents frivolous patent litigation, the time saved
by the courts through fewer lawsuits will compensate for the
lengthening of those remaining trials that require an evaluation of
the reasonableness of the prevailing party's fees. In addition, Con-
114 Shavell, 11 J Legal Stud at 71 (cited in note 106).
115 Id at 72.
216 Id.
117 See Rohm & Haas, 736 F2d at 692; Codex, 541 F Supp at 1201.
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gress has noted a further administrative advantage of expert wit-
ness fee shifting: "[u]nless successful plaintiffs can recover reason-
able expert witness fees, their attorneys may be forced to perform
pre-trial tasks that are more inexpensively and efficiently per-
formed by experts in order to permit a recovery of costs."' 8
Congress recently demonstrated the persuasiveness of policy
considerations supporting expert witness fee shifting. Based in
part on the policy implications outlined above, along with other
policies unique to the civil rights area, in 1991, Congress amended
the attorney fee shifting provision of the Civil Rights Act.1 9 This
provision now allows prevailing parties to recover "a reasonable at-
torney's fee (including expert witness fees).' 20 The House Report
explains that the amendment "express[es] Congress's intention to
conform Title VII to the rule announced in the Supreme Court's
decision in Crawford Fitting Co. v J.T. Gibbons, Inc. and West
Virginia University Hospital Inc. v Casey.' 2'
CONCLUSION
While Congress, following its own lead with respect to the
Civil Rights Act, could amend 35 USC § 285 to allow explicitly for
the recovery of expert witness fees in exceptional patent infringe-
ment cases, such an amendment is unnecessary. The Federal Cir-
cuit's current application of § 285 to allow expert witness fee
awards is entirely consistent with the existing provision's purpose
of incorporating equitable fee shifting principles. This equitable
power, as expressed by the Supreme Court, includes the authority
to shift all litigation expenses, including expert witness fees, where
the losing party has acted in bad faith. Section 285, in its language
and its application, allows fee shifting only where such an award
would be justified in equity. Congress enacted it to restore equita-
ble fee shifting to patent cases, rather than to supplement an al-
ready existing equity power. Consequently, this position overcomes
the objections suggested by West Virginia. In effect, West Virginia
does not overrule the Federal Circuit's practice of awarding expert
witness fees to prevailing parties in exceptional patent cases, and
the district courts should continue to award expert witness fees
under § 285.
"tS HR Rep No 102-40(I), 102d Cong, 1st Sess 79 (1991), in 1991 USCCAN 549, 617,
citing Friedrich, 888 F2d at 514.
119 Title VII § 706(k), codified at 42 USC § 2000e-5(k) (1988).
120 Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub L No 102-166 § 113, 105 Stat 1071, 1079 (1991).
121 HR Rep No 102-40(I) at 78-79 (cited in note 118).
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